I. INTRODUCTION
When the legislature defines a crime-when it specifies a punishment for a person shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have acted in a certain way in certain circumstances and with certain results-it succeeds in defining a second crime as well, namely the crime of attempting to commit the crime defined. The legislature could choose specifically not to proscribe the attempt to commit a crime defined, but in the absence of an explicit statement to that effect, by defining the crime the legislature grants the state the power to punish also for the attempt. Why do we have this practice? What problem are we solving by having a system in which it is automatically a crime to attempt almost every crime explicitly defined? It is natural to answer that we are solving a problem of inequality: since there is no difference in desert between the person who completes the crime and the person who tries but fails, and since there is often no other good reason to treat them differently, there ought not to be a difference in treatment by the state. A system that does not punish attempts to commit crimes treats equally deserving citizens differently and for no good reason.
To accept this justification is to make what many see as a salutary commitment to the denial of moral luck. Those who take there to be moral luck, in the sense in which the term is to be used here, hold that it is possible for two actions to differ morally in virtue of the fact that they differ in some respect that was entirely out of the control of the agent of either action.
1 In fact, the intuitive thought that there can be a moral difference between an action, on the one hand, and a failed attempt to perform the very same action, on the other, is often cited as support for the contention that some moral intuitions point towards the existence of moral luck.
2 After all, often the difference between succeeding and merely trying is nothing but a difference in the air currents wafting through different parts of the casino. Yet, it seems intuitively that this difference can make a moral difference. So, it is no surprise that those who take the intuition to be flawed also think that the point of criminalizing attempts is, precisely, to correct for the influence of this flawed intuition in our legal system. People who take this line are also disturbed by the sentencing practices that we find in many jurisdictions, practices which seem to involve a commitment to moral luck. Many jurisdictions provide lesser penalties for attempted crimes than for completed; under the common law, for instance, an attempted felony is a misdemeanor.
3 In response, a number of theorists, 4 and the drafters of the Model Penal Code, 5 1 Thus, for the purposes of this paper, my concern is with moral luck as it applies to the assessment of actions, and not to the assessment of agents, except in so far as assessment of actions is a form of assessment of agents. My concern then is not with so called ''constitutive'' luck: luck that influences what sort of person an agent is. My concern is, however, with ''consequential'' luck and, to some degree, with ''opportunity'' luck. What one does often depends both on what consequences flow from what one does and on what opportunities one had to act. If either can make an action morally worse or better, even when the consequence or opportunity is out of the agentÕs control, then there is moral luck.
2 Cf. Thomas Nagel, ÔMoral LuckÕ in Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 24-38. 3 States use various methods for calculating the sentence for an attempt, but most offer a lesser penalty for the attempt than for the completed crime. California, for instance, gives half the penalty of the completed crime for the attempted (see Cal. Penal Code §664). This remains the most common formula. 4 
